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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the long-term impact of an environmen-
tal policy on economic growth, pollution and welfare. A standard
growth model with horizontal innovation is modified by including pol-
lution which comes from the use of intermediate goods production.
Taxation on pollution reduces profits of final good producer as well as
intermediate good producers. In this setting, profit gains is explained
by a realloaction of labor from intermediate goods sector to R&D sec-
tor which enhances innovation, growth and welfare while it reduces
pollution.
Keywords : Porter hypothesis, endogenous growth, environmental policy
JEL Classification : D43, 031, 041, Q58
∗This paper are benefited from discussions with participants at the AFSE conference in
Nancy, 2016. I also wish to thank Aurore Pelissier for his useful suggestions. Remaining
errors are the sole responsability of the author.
1
1 Introduction
The “Porter Hypothesis”claims that an environmental policy enhances inno-
vation and growth because the long-term benefits offsets the short-term losses
and simultaneously reduces pollution (Porter and van der Linde (1995)).
From a theoretical point of view,1 a growing literature has investigated the
theoretical foundations of the “Porter Hypothesis”.2
In models of endogenous growth with vertical innovation a` la Aghion and
Howitt (1992), Hart (2004) analyzes the impact of environmental sales taxes
on growth. He shows the possibility that such sales taxes enhance growth
while improving the environment, with some conditions. Nakada (2004) ex-
amines the issue through a simpler model, focusing on the “profitability
effect”which is the loss in the profits of the intermediate sector, caused by
taxation and a “general equilibrium effect”linked to the resource constraint.3
He shows that an environmental policy increases growth while pollution is
reduced. From a modified model a` la Aghion and Griffith (2005), Bianco and
Salies (2016) analyze the effects of environmental tax on growth, pollution
and profits, by focusing on inefficiency within firms. They find necessary
conditions under which an environmental tax increases growth, profit and
reduces pollution
Based on models of endogenous growth with expanding variety (Romer
(1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991)), the literature distinguishes two
approaches. The first approach assumes that research can increase the pro-
ductivity in two different sectors, producing two types of goods - a clean and
a dirty one. In this spirit, Hung, Chang, and Blackburn (1994) using a model
of Romer (1990) analyze the effects of environmental conservation on growth.
They find that in most cases pollution control is not growth depressant. In
the second approach, technical change either increases productivity and/or
reduces the pollution intensity of a given production input. Verdier (1995)
investigates the validation of the “Porter Hypothesis”using a modified model
of Grossman and Helpman (1991). He shows that environmental taxation
promotes growth if the environmental tax rate is low enough. Elbasha and
Roe (1996) use also a model of Romer (1990) but in a small open economy
in the presence of environmental externalities. They demonstrate that a
1See Ricci (2007a) for an exhaustive survey of the literature focused on channels of
transmission of environmental policy on growth.
2We focuse only on the macroeconomic literature based on endogenous growth models
with innovation. This kind of model appears to us to be the best framework for under-
standing the “Porter Hypothesis”.
3Unlike Hart (2004) and Nakada (2004), using similar models, Grimaud (1999) and
Ricci (2007b) do not find validation of the “Porter Hypothesis”.
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greener preference increases the growth rate if the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is small but they don’t focus on the explanation of the “Porter
Hypothesis”.
Following the last theoretical framework based on the second approach,
we propose a model to examine the theoretical foundations of the “Porter
Hypothesis”without restrictions either on the level of the environmental tax
rate or on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In addition, we also
introduce a “profitability effect”in our model. For this purpose, we develop
a standard endogenous growth model with horizontal innovation a` la Gancia
and Zilibotti (2005) modified by including the use of intermediate goods by
the final good producer as source of pollution. Moreover, we assume that the
pollution affects negatively the household’s utility.
Nakada (2004) studies also the effects of an environmental policy but
in an endogenous growth model with vertical innovation with an exogenous
pollution intensity and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals to
one. In our paper, the pollution intensity is determined endogenously by
assuming that this environmental index is linked negatively to the number
of varieties of intermediate goods. Moreover, we use a more general utility
function in which the elasticity is assumed to be greater than zero which
allow us to take into account the effect of pollution on the marginal utility
of consumption.
The rest of the paper is strutured as follows. Section 2 describes the
overall framework of the model. Section 3 addresses the effects of a more
strict environmental regulation on growth and pollution. Section 4 analyzes
the implications of this kind of policy on welfare. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Our starting point is the standard version of the Romerian growth scheme
as exposed in Gancia and Zilibotti (2005).4 In this framework, the economy
consists of four types of agents. Producers of a final good who use intermedi-
ate goods input to produce their output which is used only for consumption.
Producers of intermediate good who use labor as single production factor.
The technology to produce this output is assumed to be obtained from a
research firm. This firm uses only labor in order to produce a new variety
of intermediate goods. Finally, an infinitely lived representative household
determines his consumption by maximizing an intertemporal utility function.
We modify this standard framework by introducing pollution as a by-product
4We use the variation of the benchmark model called “labor for intermediates”but with
a notation close to Acemoglu (2009) which is more clear.
3
of intermediate goods which affects negatively the utility of the representative
household.
2.1 The final good sector
The unique final good is produced competitively with the production function
Y (t) =
1
1− β
∫ N(t)
0
x(v, t)1−βdv, (1)
where 0 < β < 1, N(t) represents the different number of varieties of inter-
mediate goods available to be used in the production process at time t and
x(v, t) is the total amount of intermediate goods of variety v used at time t.
For notational simplicity, the term 1− β in the denominator is included and
we assume that the price of final good at each date is equal to one.
In an interesting paper, Koesler (2010) mentions that the integration of
pollution in an economic growth model requires the consideration of three
aspects: the nature of pollution, the source of pollution and the effects of
pollution on the agents in the economy. Concerning the nature of pollution,
as in Elbasha and Roe (1996) and Koesler (2010) among others, we model the
pollution as a flow variable. This means that pollution exclusively depends
on the amount of pollution generates in the present period. Concerning
the source of pollution, we support the idea that the flow of pollution is
being related to an externality of the production process. More precisely, as
in Nakada (2004), agregate level of pollution P (t) depends on the level of
intermediate goods x(v, t) and an environmental technology index z(v, t) ∈
[0, 1]5
P (t) =
∫ N(t)
0
z(v, t)x(v, t)dv. (2)
Unlike Nakada (2004), we assume that the pollution intensity depends neg-
atively on the number of variety of intermediate goods (z(v, t) = 1/N(t)).6
Finally, we shall see how we model the effects of pollution when we shall
present the household’s preference.
5Hung, Chang, and Blackburn (1994) also assume that the agregate pollution is de-
termined by the production of intermediate goods but in a more general case. Indeed,
they assume that the environmental damage is a function z(xD(i, τ)) where ∂z(.)/∂x ≥ 0.
However, unlike us, they don’t take into account the intensity of pollution.
6In the same spirit, Bianco and Salies (2016) determine endogenously the pollution
intensity by assuming that this index is linked negatively to the quality of intermediate
goods instead of the number of intermediate goods because they use a schumpeterian
endogenous growth model.
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Unlike Koesler (2010), we assume that the government is to levy an envi-
ronmental tax on polluters in order to offer an incentive to reduce pollution.
We assume that this tax is levied proportionally to the level of pollution
from the final production sector as in Nakada (2004) and Bianco and Salies
(2016).
The profit function of the final good producer in the presence of environ-
mental tax is given by
piY (t) =
1
1− β
∫ N(t)
0
x(v, t)1−βdv−
∫ N(t)
0
p(v, t)x(v, t)dv−h(t)
∫ N(t)
0
x(v, t)
N(t)
dv,
(3)
where p(v, t) is the price of a variety v of intermediate goods and h(t) ∈ (0, 1)
represents the environmental tax rate.
The first order condition gives us the inverse demand of intermediate good
by the final good producer
p(v, t) = x(v, t)−β − h(t)
N(t)
. (4)
2.2 The intermediate goods sector
Like Verdier (1995) and Nakada (2004), we assume that the only input used
in the intermediate goods production is labor.7 But we depart from our
analysis on two points. First, we assume that for each firm to produce one
unit of intermediate goods, ψ unit of labor is required instead of only one.
Second, we assume that this latter is inversely linked to the number of variety
as follows ψ = 1/N(t). Thus, the profit of each intermediate good producer
is given by
pi(v, t) = x(v, t)1−β − h(t)
N(t)
x(v, t)− ψw(t)x(v, t). (5)
At this stage, as in Verdier (1995), we assume that the government controls
the environmental tax by the indicator φ which denotes the emission tax in
labor units, i.e., φ = h(t)
w(t)
which is constant in time.8 So, the equation (5)
can be rewritten as follows
pi(v, t) = x(v, t)1−β −
(
1 + φ
N(t)
)
x(v, t)w(t), (6)
7Hung, Chang, and Blackburn (1994) assume that γs unit of the final goods is needed
to produce one unit of the intermediate input.
8Nakada (2004) and Bianco and Salies (2016) use the same assumption in our models.
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where w(t) is the wage rate at time t.
The first order condition of the firm gives the labor demand function
x(v, t) =
[
1− β
(1 + φ)ω
] 1
β
≡ x˜(ω), (7)
where ω = w(t)
N(t)
represents the wage rate adjusted to the productivity which
is constant in time and x˜(ω) denotes the productivity adjusted labor demand
of each firm.
Substituting (7) into (4) gives the price of intermediate goods
p(v, t) = x˜(ω)−β − φω. (8)
The profit of each firm is obtained by substituting (7) into (6)
pi(v, t) =
(
β
1− β
)
(1 + φ)ωx˜(ω). (9)
We can note that the profit of the intermediate goods producer is determined
by two opposite effects as in Nakada (2004). The first one, called “profitabil-
ity effect”represents the positive effect of environmental tax on profit. In-
deed, an increase in environmental tax increases the mark-up rate and thus
increases the profit. The second one which is negative and offsets the first
one is the “traditional effect”which decreases the profit by reducing the labor
demand. Finally, the composition of these two effects represents what Porter
and van der Linde (1995) called the short-term loss of the environmental
policy.
2.3 The R&D sector
As in Gancia and Zilibotti (2005), the innovation possibilities frontier is given
by
N˙(t) = ηN(t)HR(t), (10)
where η > 0 represents the productivity of workers and HR(t) is the number
of workers employed in the R&D sector at time t.
As usual, the Hamilton-Bellman-Jacobi equation is
r(t)V (v, t)− V˙ (v, t) = pi(v, t), (11)
where V (v, t) is the net present discounted value of owning the blueprint of
an intermediate good of variety v at time t and r(t) represents the interest
rate at time t.
6
When there is positive research, the free entry condition is given by
ηV (v, t) = ω. (12)
The left-side of the equation (12) is the return from hiring one more worker
for R&D and the right-side represents the flow cost of hiring one more worker
for R&D, w(t).
2.4 The household and the government
We model the effects of pollution by making the household’s preference neg-
atively dependent on the flow of pollution present in the economy. Unlike
Elbasha and Roe (1996) who use a variable measuring the quality of the
environment, we prefer to use a simpler way and follow Hung, Chang, and
Blackburn (1994), Michel and Rotillon (1995), Nakada (2004) and Verdier
(1995). Indeed, we incorporate pollution directly in the utility of household
which causes disutility9
U(t) =

1
1− θ
([
C(t)P (t)−δ
]1−θ − 1) for 0 < θ <∞ and θ 6= 1,
lnC(t)− δ lnP (t) for θ = 1.
(13)
where δ > 1 − β and θ represent parameters determining respectively the
household’s preference toward a clean environment and the multiplicative
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and C(t) is the con-
sumption of the household at time t.
The representative household sets a consumption plan to maximize the
present value stream of utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint.
The consumption plan satifies a standard Euler equation10
gC ≡ C˙(t)
C(t)
=
r(t)− ρ
θ
, (14)
where ρ > 0 is the time preference rate and the following transversality
condition
lim
t→∞
[
µ(t)A(t)e−ρt
]
= 0. (15)
9This utility function is a generalization of the utility function used by Hung, Chang,
and Blackburn (1994) and Nakada (2004). Indeed, if we assume θ = 1 and δ = β, we
obtain the utility function assumed by Hung, Chang, and Blackburn (1994) and if we
assume θ = 1 and δ = 1, we obtain the utility function assumed by Nakada (2004).
Althrough Verdier (1995) uses a utility function quite different, if we assume θ = 1, we
obtain a utility function close to Verdier (1995).
10Inserting equation (7) into equation (2) yields P (t) = x˜(ω) which is constant over time
because ω and φ are also constant.
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The governement regulates the economy by using the environmental tax
(h(t)) and tranfers this fiscal revenue to the household (T (t)).
h(t)P (t) = T (t). (16)
2.5 The balanced growth path
The resource constraint of the economy at time t is
C(t) ≤ Y (t). (17)
In the labor market, workers are assumed to be employed either in pro-
duction or in research
H = Hx(t) +HR(t), (18)
where H is the total number of workers,11 Hx(t) is the number of workers in
production and HR(t) is the number of workers in research.
Since the interest rate (14) and the profit of intermediate good producer
(9) are constant, thus V˙ (t) = 0. This implies that the net present discounted
value of the firm is given by
V ∗ =
pi(v, t)
r∗
=
(
β
1−β
)
(1 + φ)ωx˜(ω)
r∗
. (19)
Hence the balanced growth path equilibrium interest rate must be
r∗ = η
(
β
1− β
)
(1 + φ)H∗x. (20)
The fact that the number of workers in production must be constant in the
balanced growth path follows from (18).
Now using the Euler equation of the representative household, (14), the
growth rate of consumption is
g∗C =
η
(
β
1−β
)
(1 + φ)H∗x − ρ
θ
≡ g∗. (21)
To complete the characterization of the balanced growth path equilib-
rium, the balanced growth path level of employment, H∗x needs to be deter-
mined. From the innovation possibilities frontier, (10), we obtain N˙(t)/N(t) =
11As in the standard endogeneous growth model with horizontal innovation, we assume
that the labor force is constant.
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ηH∗R = η(H−H∗x). Moreover, by definition, the balanced growth path growth
rate of consumption must be equal to the rate of technological progress. Thus
g∗ = N˙(t)/N(t). This implies that the balanced growth path level of em-
ployement is uniquely determined as follows
H∗x =
ηθH + ρ
η
(
β
1−β
)
(1 + φ) + ηθ
. (22)
Finally, the balanced growth path equilibrium interest rate is given by
r∗ =
(
β
1−β
)
(1 + φ) (ηθH + ρ)(
β
1−β
)
(1 + φ) + θ
, (23)
and the long-run growth rate of the economy is then obtained as
g∗ =
η
(
β
1−β
)
(1 + φ)H − ρ(
β
1−β
)
(1 + φ) + θ
. (24)
Let us assume that η
(
β
1−β
)
(1 + φ)H > ρ and ρ > β(1−θ)(1+φ)ηH
1+βφ
.
The first inequality ensures that the long-run growth rate is positive while
the second one ensures that the representative household’s utility is finite and
the transversality condition is satisfied.
3 Effects of a stricter environmental policy
In this section, we analyse the effects of a stricter environmental taxation on
long-run growth rate and pollution.
Proposition 1 A higher environmental tax increases the long-run growth
rate of the economy.
Proof. The derivative of g∗ with respect to φ is positive.
∂g∗
∂φ
=
(
β
1−β
)
(ηHθ + ρ)[(
β
1−β
)
(1 + φ) + θ
]2 > 0.
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Proposition 1 shows the positive impact of environmental policy on growth.
On the one hand, a tax on pollution reduces the intermediate profits be-
cause it decreases not only final output but also intermediate demand. This
negative effect represents the short-term loss caused by the environmental
taxation and called “profitability effect”by Nakada (2004). As in Nakada
(2004), this effect is alleviated due to an increase in the price elasticity of
demand but its overall impact on the profit of intermediate good producers
remains negative. On the other hand, environmental tax has an indirect ef-
fect on the labor market called “labor reallocation effect”. Indeed, this tax
reduces final good production which decreases the supply of each intermedi-
ate good producer and thus implies a reallocation of labor from intermediate
goods sector to R&D sector. Overall, the “labor reallocation effect”offsets
the “profitability effect”. Finally, the tax on pollution enhances innovation
and growth.
Proposition 2 A higher environmental tax decreases pollution.
Proof. The derivative of P (t) with respect to φ is negative.
∂P (t)
∂φ
=
(−1
β
)(
1− β
ω
) 1
β
(1 + φ)
−(1+β)
β < 0.
Proposition 2 shows the negative effect of environmental policy on pollu-
tion. As we already shows a tax on pollution reduces the level of intermediate
goods used by the final good producer and thus the level of pollution because
it is proportional to intermediate goods production.
4 Welfare analysis
In this subsection, we examine the impact of environmental policy on welfare.
From the equation (13), the welfare along the balanced growth path is given
by the following equation12 :
W (t) =
∫ ∞
0
1
1− θ
(
[C(t)P (t)−δ]1−θ − 1) e−ρtdt. (25)
Using (17), the welfare can be rewritten as
W =
(
1
1− θ
)
{[Y (0)P (0)−δ]1−θ ( 1
ρ− g∗(1− θ)
)
− 1
ρ
}, (26)
12We focus only on the more general case where the elasticity of substitution is different
from one (θ 6= 1).
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where Y (0) > 0 (respectively P (0)) is the level of the production (respectively
the pollution) in the economy at time 0.
In order to highlight the different impacts of the environmental tax upon
the consumer’s welfare, we analyze the first derivative of the expression (26)
with respect to the environmental tax φ
dW
dφ
=
[
∂Y (0)
∂φ
P (0)−δ
] [
Y (0)P (0)−δ
]−θ [ 1
ρ− g∗(1− θ)
]
−
[
δP (0)−δ−1Y (0)
∂P (0)
∂φ
] [
Y (0)P (0)−δ
]−θ [ 1
ρ− g∗(1− θ)
]
(27)
+
[
∂g∗
∂φ
[ρ− g∗(1− θ)]2
] [
Y (0)P (0)−δ
]1−θ
.
The first term of the equation (27) or the production effect refers to the
impact of the environmental policy upon the consumer’s welfare through its
effect on the production of the final good. Indeed, an increase of the environ-
mental tax reduces the demand of the final good producer in intermediate
goods and leads to a decrease in the production of final good. This explains
why the production effect is negative.
The second term of the equation (27) or the pollution effect refers to the
impact of the envrionmental policy upon the consumer’s welfare through its
effect on pollution. Indeed, as the polution is determined by the quantity of
intermediate goods used in the production, an increase in the environmental
tax reduces the latter and therefore leads to a decrease in pollution. But a
decrease in pollution affects positively the consumer’s welfare, that why the
pollution effect is positive.
The third term of the equation (27) or the growth effect refers to the
impact of the environmental policy upon the consumer’s welfare through its
effect on the growth rate. A higher environmental tax stimulates the growth
rate. This growth effect is thus positive.
To summarize, the environmental policy affects the consumer’s welfare
through three channels. The production effect decreases welfare because it
reduces the demand of intermediate goods. In contrast, the pollution effect
increases welfare because it decreases also the demand of intermediate goods.
Finally, the growth effect is positive for all the consumers.
Unlike Nakada (2004),13 we determine the overall effect of the environ-
mental policy on welfare. Indeed, we show that the two positive effects
(growth and pollution effects) offset the negative effect (production effect)
without constraints on the value of parameters.
13Indeed, in his paper, Nakada (2004) analyzes only the different effects of the environ-
mental tax on welfare but not the overall effect.
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Proposition 3 A higher environmental tax increases welfare if the house-
hold’s preference toward a clean environment is large enough.
Proof. See Appendix B.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the long-run impact of an environmental
policy on economic growth and pollution. For this purpose, we modify the
Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) endogenous growth model by including pollution
which comes from the use of intermediate goods production and by assuming
an negative externality of pollution on consumer’s utility. This allows us to
describe in a very simple model the “win-win”situation called in the literature
the “Porter Hypothesis”.
The analysis shows that environmental taxation decreases the level of final
good production and the demand for intermediate goods, thus, it decreases
the profit of intermediate good producers. However, in our setting, as in
Nakada (2004) environmental taxation also alleviates this impact because
it decreases the price elasticity of intermediate demand and raises its rate
of mark-up. Moreover, the reallocation of labor from intermediate goods
sector to R&D sector enhances innovation and thus growth. Finally, we find
that environmental taxation increases growth as well as reduces the level of
pollution which provides theoretical foundations of the “Porter Hypothesis”.
In addition, the environmental policy affects the consumer’s welfare through
three channels. The production effect decreases welfare because it reduces
the demand of intermediate goods. In contrast, the pollution effect increases
welfare because it decreases also the demand of intermediate goods. Finally,
the growth effect is positive for all the consumers. Unlike Nakada (2004), we
show that the overall effect of the environmental policy on welfare is positive.
Appendix A : the household problem
The household maximizes its overall utility in consideration of its initial asset
and income while taking the flow of pollution in the economy as exogenously
given. Thus the household’s optimization problem is
max
C(t)
U(t) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
1
1− θ
([
C(t)P (t)−δ
]1−θ − 1) dt,
s.t. A˙(t) = r(t)A(t) + w(t) + T (t)− C(t),
A(0) = A0,
12
where 0 < ρ < ∞ represents the rate of time preference, A(t) the assets
owned by the household, r(t) the interest rate, T (t) the transfert of the fiscal
revenue to the household and w(t) the wage. The current value Hamiltonian
is
H(t, A(t), C(t), µ(t)) =
1
1− θ
([
C(t)P (t)−δ
]1−θ − 1)
+µ(t) [r(t)A(t) + w(t) + T (t)− C(t)] ,
where µ(t) is the Hamiltonian multiplier.
The first order conditions are
∂H(.)
∂C(t)
= C(t)−θP (t)−δ(1−θ) − µ(t), (28)
˙µ(t) = ρµ(t)− ∂H(.)
∂A(t)
, (29)
and the transversality condition given by
lim
t→∞
[
µ(t)A(t)e−ρt
]
= 0.
Finally, deriving equation (28) with respect to time and combining the
derivative with equation (29) yields to the following equation
C˙(t)
C(t)
=
η(1− θ) P˙ (t)
P (t)
+ r(t)− ρ
θ
. (30)
As the pollution is constant over time, the previous equation yields to equa-
tion (21).
Appendix B : the welfare analysis
As the growth effect (the third term of the equation (27)) is always posi-
tive, we just have to demonstrate that the production effect (the first term
of the equation (27)) which is negative is more than compensated by the
pollution effect (the second term of the equation (27)) which is positive.
As
[
Y (0)P (0)−δ
]−θ
and
[
1
ρ−g∗(1−θ) − 1ρ
]
are positive, this condition can be
rewritten as
−
[
δP (0)−δ−1Y (0)
∂P (0)
∂φ
]
>
∂Y (0)
∂φ
P (0)−δ.
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Rearranging this inequality, we get
δ >
∂Y (0)
∂φ
∂P (0)
∂φ
P (0)
Y (0)
From equations (1), (7) and (17), we obtain the level of production at the
initial date t = 0, Y (0) =
(
1
1−β
)
x˜(ω)1−βN(0). From equations (2) and
(7), we obtain the level of pollution at the initial date t = 0, P (0) = x˜(ω).
Rearranging this inequality, we get the following condition δ > 1− β which
is always true by definition.
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